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ESSAY
CIVIC VIRTUE AT WORK: UNIONS AS
SEEDBEDS OF THE CIVIC VIRTUESf
THOMAS C. KOHLER*
The good citizen should know and have the capacity both to be
ruled and to rule, and this very thing is the virtue of a citizen—
knowledge of rule over free persons from both [points of view] )
The three great relations in private life are, 1. That of master
and servant; . 2. That of husband and wife; . . . 3. That of
parent and child . . . . 2
In democratic countries knowledge of how to combine is the
mother of all other forms of knowledge; on its progress depends that
of all the others.
Among laws controlling human societies there is one more precise
and clearer, it seems to me, than all the others. If men are to remain
civilized or to become civilized, the art of association must develop
and improve among them at the same speed as equality of condi-
tions spreads. 3
I. INTRODUCTION
Home may be where the heart is. But, increasingly, Americans are
likely to be found at work. For better or worse, men and women are
t This essay was originally presented at the "Seedbeds of Virtue" symposium sponsored by
the Institute for American Values, December 1992. It is reprinted [in a shorter version] from the
collection of essays Seedbeds of Virtue: Sources of Competence, Character, and Citizenship in American
Society, to be published in 1995 by Madison Books.
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
AlosTomx, Poisnes, bk. 3, ch. 4, 1277b-15 (C. Lord trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1984).
2 Si It WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 422 (Garland 1978)
(1783).
3 ALEXIS nit TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 517 (Jy. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
mans., Anchor Books 1969) oath eel. 18.50).
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tied to the market and the workplace in a way never before seen. The
overall increase in labor force participation is one of the most striking
social developments of the past forty years.
A few statistics help to tell the story. Presently, ninety-three percent
of adult men are in the labor force—a figure that has remained
roughly constant for many decades. 4
 Since 1950, however, women have
increased their participation in the workforce by more than 200 per-
cent.' Today, seventy-four percent of women twenty-five to fifty-four
years old are employed,' the overwhelming proportion of them full-
time.' Likewise, the majority of mothers are in the workforce. Their
participation rates extend from seventy-five percent for women whose
youngest child is of school age, to fifty-two percent for those with
children under two.' In 1990, both spouses worked in nearly seven out
of ten married-couple families.' Working hours for women have been
increasing steadily during the past twenty years.'° A recently published
major study shows that after years of gradual decline, the normal
American work week has increased to the point where the average
employee now works the equivalent of an additional month more than
was worked in 1970."
4
 BUREAU OE LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, BULLETIN 2385, WORKING WOMEN: A
ClIARTBOOK 48 (1991) [hereinafter WORKING WOMEN: A CHARTBOoK1 (percentage reflects labor
force participation for persons 25-54 years of age). Actual participation rates for men have
declined slowly but steadily over the past three decades. Id. In 1962, 96,8% of adult men were in
the workforce. Id. For a brief consideration of the decline among men in workforce participation,
see Howard V. Hayghe & Steven H. Haugen, A Profile of Husbands in Today's Labor Market, 110
MoNnti.v LAB. REV. 12 (Oct. 1987).
5 Dana Priest, Major Changes Seen in Female Labor Force,. in 1990, 60% of Mothers with Young
Went to Work, WASH. Pos.'', Mar. 25, 1992, at A21; see also WORKING WOMEN: A CHARTBoOK, supra
Dote 4, at 48, table A-16.
{ WORKING WOMEN: A CFIARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 48. In 1990, of nine industrialized nations
(the United States, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden and the
United Kingdom) only Sweden and Canada had greater female workforce participation than the
United States. Id. at 9-10. Since 1970, the participation gap between Sweden and the United
States narrowed, while the rate for Canadian women grew rapidly and now narrowly surpasses
the U.S. rate. Id. Significant increases in workforce participation by women since 1970 also
occurred in the United States, Australia and The Netherlands. Id. Italy's rate of 30% was the
smallest proportion of the nations for which data was available. Id.
7 1d. at 13. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) figures show that 77% of employed adult
women worked 35 or more hours weekly. Id. Among unemployed women, 80% were seeking
full-time work. Id.; see also id. at 48, table A-16.
8 Id. at 35. For more statistics, see id. at 50, table A-18.
9 Priest, supra note 5, at A21 (reporting results from a Government Accounting Office study
issued March 24, 1992). The BLS reports that since 1970, the proportion of children in two-parent
families where both parents were in the labor force increased from 36% to 61%. WORKING
WOMEN: A CHART1100K, supra note 4, at 33.
1 ° Between 1970 and 1989, the proportion of women working on a full-time, year round basis
grew from 41% to 51%. WORKING WOMEN: A CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 13.
" Jutat-7 B. SGHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE
17-43 (1991).
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These figures burst with implications. Among them is this: the job
has become a central part of most people's lives, and work increasingly
is the place that people spend the major share of their waking hours.
People make themselves to be what they are through the activities in
which they habitually engage. Consequently, anyone interested in the
sources of character and citizenship in American society must pay
attention to those institutions that can serve to inculcate, sustain and
enhance the civic virtues in the workplace. Chief among such institu-
tions are trade unions and the practice of collective bargaining.
This claim may jar some readers a bit, or strike them as being at
best naive. (Indeed, some of the less charitably inclined may see it as
being the equivalent of nominating Boss Pendergast as citizen of the
year.) In one respect, such reactions are not surprising. Once the
subject of fervent controversy, unions represent one of the few things
about which liberals and conservatives generally agree. And, as the new
consensus has it, unions are relics of the past, inappropriate to an era
of global economic competition and irrelevant if not downright detri-
mental to promoting the common good. An interest in unions tends
to be treated as a species of antiquarianism even among academic
employment law specialists,' 2 who increasingly have come to regard
proposals for rethinking and reviving unions as being no less quixotic
than a movement to bring back manned lighthouses.
As conservatives typically understand them, unions are purely
economic institutions. They represent no more than self-interested
affiliations among otherwise unrelated economic actors, whose princi-
pal purpose is to extract higher wages for less work than a freely
functioning market would otherwise permit. Unions achieve their goals
by acting (or attempting to act) as monopolies. Through exerting
control over employment terms—and in some industries (particularly
the crafts) by their ability to limit the supply of labor—unions distort
the outcomes of the market process in favor of their members. By
trumping the market, many conservatives argue, unions decrease over-
all social welfare by imposing costs that everyone else must bear.
These costs take a number of forms. As their critics point out,
unions are more prevalent in those sectors of the economy where
income and productivity are naturally high. The impact of unions on
the wage structure of industries in these sectors causes firms to limit
their demand for workers. This results in unnaturally high numbers of
people being employed in the lower-paid sectors of the economy where
less-skilled service occupations tend to predominate. Consequently, the
12 Who were called "labor lawyers" until sometime in the early 1980s.
282	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 36:279
gains enjoyed by the "barons of labor" (who were relatively well-off to
start with) come at the expense of the non-unionized, whose upward
mobility is retarded by the presence in the market of organized work-
ers. Thus, their critics frequently assert, unions create inequities in the
distribution of income. Furthermore, union work rules and other
restrictions of management discretion also lower the productivity of
labor and capital. In short, as many conservatives portray it, unions
leave everyone but their members worse–off by obstructing the ef-
ficient allocation and use of resources.
The degree to which this picture of the economic impact of
unions is accurate remains a matter of debate among professional
economists. Recent empirical work has called much of it into question.
Several studies, for instance, demonstrate that unionized workers gen-
erally are more productive than their unorganized counterparts.' 3 Re-
cent evidence also indicates that, on balance, unions have the effect
of decreasing the dispersion of labor earnings between highly and
lesser-compensated workers. Similarly, the data show that unions have
improved the economic status of black males relative to white males.' 4
Despite this, the disapprobation of unions is hardly confined to con-
servatives and free-market advocates. Liberals themselves increasingly
regard unions as the detritus of a bygone age whose value (to the
extent it existed) long since has disappeared.
The standard liberal critique of unions proceeds not in economic
terms, but in the language of individual rights. It rests on the view that
majorities cannot be trusted because they pose an ever-present threat
to personal liberties and to the unfettered exercise of individual choice.
As a result, many liberals regard unions with the same profound sus-
picion they exhibit toward legislatures and other institutions of major-
ity will. From this perspective, individuals are freest and most secure
when protected from the biases that almost invariably drive decision-
making in majoritarian institutions. Consequently, as many liberals see
it, functions typically performed by unions can be discharged more
reliably and equitably by some arm of the state.
For instance, disputes over employee dismissals—which in the
unionized setting typically are adjusted through a private grievance-ar-
bitration process that the employer and union jointly administer—are
13 See RONALD C. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND
PUBLIC Poi.icY 36(}-62 (1982); Rict-tmEn B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do?
162-81 (1984).
14
 See EHRENBERG & SMITH, Supra note 13, at 356-58; FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 13, at
78-93.
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seen by many liberals as matters better adjudicated before a court or
a state administrative body. Likewise, liberals generally regard other
aspects of the employment relationship as being more equitably, ef-
ficiently and effectively established through uniform statutory stand-
ards rather than by the terms of a privately—negotiated collective bar-
gaining agreement. In this view, fairness is a function of procedure,
the regularity and formality of which the state can best guarantee.
Thus, universal prescriptions are preferable to particular solutions
developed at the local level by those directly affected. In fact, as many
liberals see it, the union movement represents something like an his-
torical stage in the evolution of the sovereign individual self whose
progressive absolutization has occurred through the state's growing
recognition of an ever-more comprehensive body of personal liberties
that majorities may not qualify or infringe.
The thoroughgoing distrust of majority rule that underlies many
liberals' misgivings about unions also marks the point at which the
views of the left and the right frequently converge. Many conservatives,
especially those with a libertarian bent, also distrust majorities. The
jointly-held suspicion about majoritarian institutions often leads liber-
als and conservatives alike to the same conclusion. Consequently, left
and right condemn unions on the same basis that they often employ
to argue that the judiciary's power to overturn legislation is necessary
if individual rights are to be secure. Ordering carried out through
non-representative institutions, they agree, is more efficient and stable
than reliance upon majority rule. What chiefly separates the two schools,
of course, are the sorts of policies they think these non-representative
institutions should implement, and what the character of these non-
representative institutions should be. An unrelieved skepticism about
the ability of the average person to act intelligently, reasonably and
with self-restraint compels many on the right and left to the view that
democracy is at best a utopian ideal. The state or the market are the
alternatives they offer. But, in either case, the "iron cage" of techno-
cratic orders and bureaucratic rationality are the results they ultimately
suggest.
Unbeloved by elites, unions do not seem to fare well in the popu-
lar mind either. Not infrequently, the idea of unionism seems to be
associated with Archie Bunker-like characters, cartoon versions of auto-
cratic and possibly corrupt "boss" leadership, featherbedding work
rules, and unnecessary contentiousness. Indeed, the less direct knowl-
edge that individuals have of the collective bargaining process, the
harsher their attitudes toward unions seem to be. Reporting on data
collected by the National Longitudinal Survey, a recent study found
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that current involvement in a union constituted by far the most sig-
nificant factor in differentiating supporters from opponents of unions
among members of the labor force.I 6 Opportunities for familiarization,
however, fast are decreasing. Presently, only 11.9 percent of the pri-
vate—sector workforce is organized.' 6 In 1930, with the depression in
full-swing and passage of the Wagner Act still five years away, the rate
stood at 10.2 percent.I 7 Some forecast that if current trends continue,
unions will represent only about seven percent of the private sector
workforce by the end of the decade.' 8
Our currently prevailing views about unions, along with the ap-
parent demise of collective bargaining in the United States, come at a
strange time. During the past twenty-five years, the overall distribution
of wages and earnings in the United States has become increasingly
unequal, and there has been a pronounced erosion in the size of the
nation's middle-class.' 8 Migration out of the middle-class has occurred
in both directions, and there has been growth in both the upper and
lower classes. After 1980, however, the chances for movement out of
the lower economic class lessened, with only the college-educated
demonstrating a higher than average probability of moving into the
middle income group. During the same period, a smaller share of
adults fell out of the upper-class, but the chances of descending from
the middle to the lower-class significantly increased. A shift in the
sources of total household income has also occurred. The portion
derived from earnings fell while that attributable to capital investments
15 Stephen M. Hills, The Attitudes of Union and Nonunion Male Workers Toward Union
Representation, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 179,190 (1985); see also Seymour Martin Lipset, Labor
Unions in the Public Mind, in UNIONS IN TRANSITION: ENTERING 'HIE SECOND CENTURY 287-321
(Seymour Martin Lipset ed., 1986).
16 Union Membership Unchanged at 16.1 Percent of Employment in 1991, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), Feb. 11,1992, at A.A. Union density steadily has been declining in the private sector in
the United States since the mid 1950s. In 1958,34% of private sector employees were unionized.
By 1980, just 24% were—a decline unprecedented in American history. The free-fall in density
continued throughout the 1980s. See Michael A. Curme et al., Union Membership and Contract
Coverage in the United States, 1983-1988, 44 'Paws. & LAB. REL. REv. 5 (1990).
17 IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW-DEAL COLLECTIVE; BARGAINING POLICY 2 (1950).
1a Leo Troy, Convergence in International Unionism, etc.: The Case of Canada and the USA, 30
BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 1, 38 (1992).
19 SeeBUREAD OP"EHE CENSUS, ECON. AND STATS, ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REi.owrs, SERIES P-60, No.177, TRE.NIDS IN RELATIVE INCOME: 1964-1989, at 1-4 and
accompanying tables (1991); Greg Duncan et al., The Incredible Shrinking Middle Class, AMERICAN
DEMOGRAPHICS, May 1992, at 34-38 (summary of study conducted by Univ. of Mich. Survey
Research Center); W. Norton Grubb & Robert H. Wilson, Trends in Wage and Salary Inequality,
1967-88, MONTHLY LAB. REv., June 1992, at 23; Paul Ryscavage & Peter Henle, Earnings Inequal-
ity Accelerates in the 1980's, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1990, at 3. The difficulties in tracing these
trends are well described in the Grubb & Wilson study.
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increased. Likewise, growth occurred in the upper-end, while lower-
income households experienced a stagnation in real earnings. In fact,
one recent study shows that average hourly wages have been declining
for well over a decade, and are fourteen percent lower than they were
in 1979."
Along with these developments has come a significant loosening
of the employment bond. So-called contingent employment arrange-
ments—part-time, temporary and contract arrangements—are on the
rise, and many analysts expect the number of part-time employees to
double in the next few years. 21 These just-in-time" employees typically
have at best highly restricted claims to pension, health and other
benefits incident to employment. In testimony before Congress, one
well-known observer of labor market trends characterized contingent
employment arrangements as representing "the utmost in fluidity and
flexibility."22 Such arrangements, she testified, increase productivity by
permitting employers to expand or contract work-hours at-will. More-
over, an employer "incurs no legal or moral obligation" to offer con-
tingent workers "severance pay or layoff benefits, or rights to re-em-
ployment."23 Similarly, employers "have no implied commitment to
provide promotion opportunities, or to offer training and/or develop-
ment" to members of the contingent workforce." Use of contingent
workers, she stated, also enables employers to enhance the employ-
ment security of "core employees."25 As American industry seeks to
become more competitive, she predicted "all employment relation-
ships are going to become more fluid." 2 C
Domestic trends aside, the collapse of collective bargaining in the
United States also seems odd in light of comparative developments. In
anticipation of its planned economic and monetary union, the Euro-
pean Economic Community adopted its Charter on the Fundamental
20 See Lawrence Mishel Jared Bernstein, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA (1993) ; David
R. Francis, U.S. Workers on job Longer for Less Pay, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 15, 1992, at 8.
21 John F. Stenson, jr., Multiple jobholding up Sharply in the 1980's, MONTHLY LAB. REv., July
1990, at 3. Statistics also show a sharp increase in the number of people holding multiple jobs—an
increase of 52% between 1985 and 1989. Id. Women accounted for two-thirds of this increase. As
of 1990, 72 million Americans held two or more jobs. Id.
22 Rising Use of Part-Time and Temporary Workers: Who Benefits and Who Loses? Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Employment and Housing, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (May 19, 1988) (statement
of Audrey Freedman, Executive Director, Human Resources Program Group, The Conference
Board).
25 Id. at 38.
24 Id.
ss Id. at 38-39.
26 Id. at 36.
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Social Rights of Workers (the "Social Charter" or "Charter") in Decem-
ber, 1989.27
 The Charter provides a comprehensive stipulation of twelve
basic rights and policies that address the "social dimension" of the
Community's internal market plan. 28
 These principles constitute an
integral and organic part of the single market scheme of European
unity. Consequently, the Charter's preamble declares "solemnly that
the implementation of the single European Act must take full account
of the social dimension of the Community."29
 It further states that "the
same importance must be attached to the social aspects as the eco-
nomic aspects" in establishing the single market, and it requires that
these two dimensions "must be developed in a balanced manner." 3°
Perhaps the most surprising thing about the Social Charter from
an American perspective is the way its principles were developed and
the means suggested for their implementation. The principles set forth
in the Social Charter grew directly out of an informal "social dialogue"
between European–level trade unions and employers' associations.
The discussions between these "social partners" subsequently were
supplemented and formalized by the European Commission and re-
sulted in the promulgation of the present Charter.
Given its source, the fact that the Social Charter guarantees the
right of employers and workers to organize trade organizations to
defend their economic and social interests hardly is startling. Much
more remarkable, to an American at least, are the Charter's strong
affirmation of collective bargaining as a social institution and the
breadth with which it conceives of the process. Thus, the Charter sees
collective bargaining as more than a means to adjust the economic
aspects of the employment relationship. The Charter also provides
for—and specifically encourages the use of—collective bargaining as a
method for making Community law. Moreover, the Social Charter
regards collective bargaining as having a central role in the implementa-
tion and further elaboration of the fundamental rights and policies stated
in the Charter. Indeed, the Social Charter's "Action Plan" specifically
recognizes that implementation of the Charter's policies through the
collective bargaining process makes "it possible to adapt to particular
situations and enable [s] the two sides of industry to be actively in-
volved."3 '
27
 For a further discussion of these points, see Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social
Charter: State, Corporation and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. TottuNTo U. 607 (1993).
28 Id. at 613.
29 Id. (citing Social Charter Preamble, 1 14).
3(1 Id. (citing Social Charter Preamble, 1 2).
91 Id. at 622 (citing Action Program Comm. (89) 568 Part I, 4).
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The very terminology used in the Social Charter to describe col-
lective bargaining demonstrates the markedly different attitude the
European Community takes toward this social institution. Thus, unions
and employers consistently are referred to as the "social partners" and
collective bargaining is called "social dialogue." The Community's broad
willingness, as reflected in the Charter's provisions, to rely on the
"social dialogue" as a vital means for making law similarly stands in
sharp contrast to the desiccated and over-juridified shell of what col-
lective bargaining has become in the United States. Instead of norma-
tive "dialogue" between "social partners" it is much more typical in the
United States to understand collective bargaining as a give-no-quarter
adversarial contest between wholly self-interested parties which gov-
ernment seeks to contain and limit through complex and highly tech-
nical legal doctrines.
European politicians and scholars alike long have expressed a
substantial interest in the U.S. version of "free" collective bargaining—
a system characterized by a lack of state intervention in the substantive
results of the bargaining process. It is one of history's strange little
ironies that the United States seems intent on abandoning this home-
grown institution at a time when Europe has begun to experiment with
many of its central features. Scholars who engage in the comparative
study of legal orders refer to the tendency of various systems of law to
take on similar characteristics and to develop common approaches to
solving problems as "convergence." When it comes to collective bar-
gaining, something along the lines of a "transference" rather than a
"convergence" seems at least potentially to be underway. Thus, the
employment relationship in the United States is ever-increasingly be-
ing subjected to extensive (if piecemeal) state regulation while the
stated desire of the Social Charter is to nudge the European Commu-
nity states in the opposite direction. The movement to "deregulate"
the employment relationship swept the world during the past several
years. Only in the United States, it seems, did that movement take the
perverse form of intruding government more deeply into one of the
most significant relationships of private life.
Our contemporary attitudes toward unions also seem odd in light
of the absolutely unprecedented international developments of the
past few years. Although a tendency now exists to overlook this fact,
the remarkable transformation of what used to be called the Eastern-
bloc was spearheaded by an independent trade-union movement, which
improbably survived despite the forces arrayed against it. Nor were the
Poles left to go it alone. At a time when our own government took a
wait-and-see attitude, the AFL-CIO and other unaffiliated American
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unions supported Solidarity from the first with funds, equipment and
expertise. American unions also lobbied Western governments on Soli-
darity's behalf, and worked to keep the Polish situation before the
public's eye. This was hardly an unaccustomed role for American
unions, who have a long record of supporting free trade unions and
human rights movements around the world. (It is no coincidence that
the suppression of independent unions is one of the first steps taken
by totalitarian governments of the right or the left.) In recognition of
this record, the conservative publication, Policy Review, recently named
the late George Meany, who served as president of the AFL-CIO from
1952 to 1979, as one of the "Cold War's Magnificent Seven." 32 (Others
so honored included Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer and Pope
John Paul II.) The American union movement's resolute determina-
tion to remain truly autonomous, and to set its own course, accounts
for much of the enmity it has received from intellectuals, particularly
those with a leftist orientation.
There is also a pronounced tendency today to overlook, or to be
absolutely unaware of, the domestic contributions made by the union
movement. The support of unions, for example, was crucial to the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Unions also have been in the
forefront of efforts to improve workplace safety and public health and
to ensure pay equality for the sexes. Their interest in these matters is
long-standing. Equal pay for equal work was one of the stated goals of
the Knights of Labor in its 1878 constitutions" Similarly, the Knights
by 1886 had 60,000 African-American members and when black dele-
gates were refused accommodations during a convention, white dele-
gates walked out of the offending hotel. 35
 None of this is to suggest
that the American union movement has anything like an unspotted
history concerning racial or sexual prejudice. It is merely to point out
that its record is hardly as one-sided as some unthinkingly presume. In
fact, blacks are more likely than whites to be union members and
blacks are much more likely to support unionization than are whites. 36
52 Arnold Beichman, George Meany: Worker of the World, 59 Pot.'' Rev. 49 (Winter 1992).
Meany, a highly controversial figure within and without organized labor, was President of the AFL
from 1952 until its 1955 merger with the CIO, at which time he assumed the Presidency of the
combined Federation.
33 0n these points see Milton Derber, The American Idea of Industrial Democracy, 1865 -1965,
at 95 (1970).
35 1d.
36 1-fills, supra note 15; James L. Medoff, Study for the AFL-CIO on Public's Image of Unions,
Thum( LAa Rio'. (I3NA), Dec. 24, 1984, at D-2.
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Moreover, as a group, women when surveyed are much more likely
than men to express support for unions."
So, if unions are so wonderful, why aren't people flocking to join
them? Accounting for the decline in union membership has become
something of a cottage-industry among academics. Theories abound:
prominent among them are structural changes in the economy; 38 pe-
culiar characteristics of American labor law, combined with its weak or
unsympathetic enforcement; and stiff but sophisticated employer op-
position to employee self-organization." Certainly, there is something
to all these explanations. The appreciation in the exchange rate of the
U.S. dollar, deregulation of key industries like trucking, and a contrac-
tion of the domestic industrial base all have had a strong impact on
sectors of the economy where unionization historically was strong.
Likewise, since the beginning of this century, there have been a num-
ber of organized anti-union propagandizing efforts like the "open-
shop" and "American Plan" drives led by organizations like the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers." Their present-day descendants
include the National Right to Work Committee (whose efforts are
couched in the language of individual rights) and the loosely struc-
tured campaign for a "union-free environment." American labor law
also has features that are found nowhere else in the industrialized
world: an employer's unqualified right to "permanently replace" strik-
ing workers stands as a notable example.
Additionally, the undoubted fact exists that the American union
movement has done much to hurt itself. Incidents of corruption, mob
influence and wrongdoing by union officials, for example, have had a
marked impact on our attitudes towards unions. The "McClellan Com-
mittee Hearings in the Spring of 1957," observes _James Medoff, the
author of the most extensive study yet conducted on the public's image
of unions, "seem to have had an immediate and, it appears, lasting
effect on the public's view of organized labor and its leaders." 4 ' Union
members are nearly as likely as those without union ties to hold a
negative view of labor leaders. Nor have unions done a good job of
explaining—or, perhaps, of thinking about—die role they play in so-
37 Medoff, supra note 36.
" E.g., Troy, supra note 18, at 34.
39 See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REY. 1769,1778 (1983); see also Henry J. Farber, The. Decline of Unionization
in the United States: What Can Be Learned from Recent Experience, J. LAB. EcoNr. 8-75 (1990).
On the rise of these campaigns, see REINHARD BENDIX, WORK AND AUTHORITY IN INDUS-
TRY, 254-74 (U. Cal. ed. 1974) (1956).
91 Medoff, supra note 36, at D-1.
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ciety and the contributions they can make to the common good. As
Medoff concludes, the "public is aware of some of the good for all
workers derived by trade unions." Nonetheless, "it still believes that
unions primarily act as a special interest group concerned only with
defending their higher rates of pay." 42
All of the reasons offered to explain union decline have some
force. Yet none of them, either singly or in combination, fully account
for the long but steady fall in union membership that has occurred in
the United States since the late 1950s. The real reasons for this decline
lie further back, and are part of a more complex and deeply imbedded
set of issues that ever-increasingly bedevil our society. Americans are
not anti-union. Rather, they might more accurately be characterized as
being ambivalent about unions. The overall approval rating of unions
has declined substantially over the past twenty-five years." Indeed, the
public has become more skeptical of nearly all social institutions dur-
ing that period. Nevertheless, as Seymour Martin Lipset points out,
extensive survey data repeatedly demonstrate that "the majority of
Americans believe that unions are essential and do more good than
harm, that without unions employers would maltreat workers."44 A
majority of Americans, six in ten in the most recent pol1,45 also indicate
that they "approve" of labor unions, and an overwhelming proportion,
eighty-one percent, of the population believes that "workers should
have the right to join unions."' However, as Lipset further observes,
"Majority approval of the functions of unions . . . does not translate
into willingness on the part of employed persons to vote for them."'
In fact, when questioned, only about three in ten workforce partici-
pants indicated that they would join a union if one existed at their
workplace.48
 In short, we think that unions are generally'a fine idea—
but for somebody else.
Rather than being an isolated phenomenon, many of the reasons
underlying our ambivalence toward unions are identical to our ambiva-
lence toward associations and intermediate groups of all descriptions.
In short, the declines in families, church and religious organizations,
42 Id. at 0-8.
43 See Hills, supra note 15. In 1936, the first time the Gallup Organization surveyed Americans
on this matter, 72% answered "approve" to the question, "In general, do you approve or disprove
of labor unions?" For a table tracking rates, see Lipset, supra note 15, at 301.
44 Lipset, supra note 15, at 299.
45
 Gallup Organization, Aug. 3, 1991, (telephone poll conducted July 18-21, 1991, of 1002
respondents) (30% of those questioned disapproved of unions).
45 Medoff, supra note 36, at D-D.
47 Lipset, supra note 15, at 302.
48 Medoff, supra note 36, at D-2.
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unions and voluntary associations of various types are tied. The forces
and habits of mind that erode one act to erode them all. Before
discussing how unions and collective bargaining can act to enhance
the civic virtues, it may be helpful briefly to outline the sources of
destructive pressure that the various seedbeds commonly face.
II. SOURCES OF DECLINE: WHY WE ARE INCREASINGLY AMBIVALENT
ABOUT ASSOCIATIONS
Americans love to refer to Tocqueville's characterization of the
United States as a nation of joiners. It fits with our image of ourselves
as a self-reliant, can-do people to whom the world turns for lessons
about democratic self-rule. This characterization also seems consistent
with our political institutions and our social practices. After all, the
First Amendment guarantees the freedom to associate, and few nations
have higher rates of membership in voluntary associations than do
Americans."
Nevertheless, plenty of evidence suggests that the deeply ambiva-
lent attitudes we hold toward unions apply generally to our attitudes
about communities and associations of whatever description. Recent
survey data suggest that Americans remain eager participants in the
activities of voluntary associations. Yet, the same data indicate that
during the past thirty years, much of that participation has been lim-
ited to clipping a coupon in a magazine and returning it with a small
financial contribution to an association like the Sierra Club, Common
Cause, or the American Association of Retired Persons."
The smaller, local bodies that concretely and directly mediate the
relation between individuals and the large institutions of public life—
and which consequently involve people in the often messy business of
actually associating with one another—are faring less well. Statistics
concerning the divorce rate and the number of children living in
single-parent households speak for themselves. Other primary groups
that tie people together through shared meanings are similarly frail.
Neighborhoods, town or ward meetings, grass roots political clubs, and
like institutions that characterized and grounded American democracy
largely have disappeared. Service and fraternal organizations also have
49 James Curtis, Voluntary Association Joining: A Cross-National Comparative Note, 36 AM. Soc.
REV. 872 (1971); David Horton Smith, Voluntary Action and Voluntary Groups, 1 ANN. REV. OF
Soc. 247 (1975).
50 Frank R. Baumgartner Sc jack L. Walker, Survey Research and Membership in Voluntary
Associations, 32 Am. J. PoL. Scl. 908 (1988). The American Association of Retired Persons is now
the largest voluntary association in the United States.
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experienced steep drops in membership and their futures appear
bleak: for example, the average age of a Lions Club member is fifty-
seven, and two-thirds of this service group's membership is over fifty. 51
Similarly, most mainline religious denominations have experienced a
steady and significant decline in membership during the past thirty
years. 52
Scholars and commentators seem invariably to overlook the point.
But the plain fact of the matter is that unions went into decline at
roughly the same time that all other sorts of mediating institutions in
our society began to unravel, and for strikingly similar reasons. We are
deeply and increasingly ambivalent about association in almost any
form. The decline of unions is but part of a much larger story.
The steady withering of the mainline religious denominations
provides a good illustration of the point. Americans are hardly an
irreligious people. Well-over nine in ten Americans believe in the
existence of God," and a huge proportion state that religion is "very
important" (54 percent) or "fairly important" (31 percent) in their
lives.54
 Likewise, about six in ten Americans "believe that religion can
answer all or most of today's problems."55 Nevertheless, as George
Gallup, Jr. and Jim Castelli report, "while Americans attach great im-
portance to religion, they do not equate religion with church member-
ship or attendance."56
 They also found that a vast majority of Americans
believe that one can be a good Christian or Jew without being part of
a religious congregation.°
A recently released major survey seems to support these observa-
tions. 58
 It shows that only just over half (55.1 percent) of Americans
are affiliated with Jewish or Christian religious congregations. 59 It also
reports that the unaffiliated account for more than half the population
in much of the West (excluding Utah and much of New Mexico) and
51 Flynn McRoberts, Moose, Elk, Joining the Endangered, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1991, Du Page
Section, at 1.
52 For figures and discussions, see GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S
RELIGION: AMERICAN FAITH IN THE '90's (1989); ANDREW M. GREELEY, RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN
AMERICA (1989).
53 GREELEY, supra note 52, at 13-14.
54 GALLUP & CASTELLI, supra note 52, at 37.
55
 Id. at 39.
56 Id. at 45.
57 Id.
58
 ASS'N OF STATISTICIANS OF Am. REL. BODIES, CHURCHES AND CHURCH MEMBERSHIP IN THE
U.S. (1992).
59 Id.
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in substantial sections of Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, West Vir-
ginia, Delaware, Maryland, Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont. 6°
A study of baby boomers who left mainline Protestantism° simi-
larly reflects a strong view that one can be a good Christian without
traditional church involvement. 62 This study concludes that those who
left the churches in the 1970s and 1980s will not return. The study,
however, does not show "the rejection of religion or even of the major
Christian creeds, but a pulling away from the institutional church." 69
For many baby boomers, the study reports, religious beliefs are purely
a matter of individual choice. The value placed on the exercise of
personal choice trumps denominational commitment. Nevertheless,
those who left continue to believe that the church has an important
function to perform in promoting a "moral code" for society. More-
over, nearly all who left the church want their children to receive some
form of religious education. (just how it is that the understandings of
earlier generations can be preserved, enhanced, practiced and passed
on in the absence of institutions, however, was Ieft unidentified.)
The notions of self-sovereignty, and misgivings about reliance on
a mediator of whatever character are pervasive. For example, ninety-
four percent of Americans say that they pray. 64 Yet, Americans also state
that they rely on themselves "rather than an outside power such as
God, to resolve life's problems.""" Similarly, although a substantial
majority of Americans approve of the functions unions perform in
society, and think that unions are necessary to give employees a voice
in the workplace, nearly the same number believe that they do not
need a union to get fair treatment. 66 In short, we think that unions,
churches, and the other institutions that compose civil society are
great. But, whether it's the last things, the first things, or the mundane
things of day-to-day living, we can make our own way, thanks. Perhaps
it is not surprising that Gallup and Castelli report that "Americans are
60 35.1% of Americans Linked to Religious Groups, Survey Shows, L.A. Timm July 11.1992. at
B-4. The study also shows that the unaffiliated outnumber the affiliated by a 3 to 1 margin in
large sections of Colorado, California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Montana, Michigan, central
Maine and eastern Kentucky. Id.
61 DEAN R. HOGS ET AL, VANISHING BOUNDARIES: THE RELIGION OF MAINLINE PROTESTANT
BABY-BOOMERS 13 (1994).
112 Protestant Baby-Boomers Not Returning to Church, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,1992, at 28 (expressing
findings of Professor Donald Luidens).
63 Id. (quoting Professor Donald Luidens).
64 GALLUP & CASTELLI, supra note 52, at 45.
65 Id. at 70-71.
66 Upset, supra note 15, at 302.
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the loneliest people in the world" and that one of the things Americans
most want of their churches is a "sense of community.""
Some of the reasons behind the decline in mediating groups lie
fairly near the surface. With a greater proportion of the population
actively participating in the workplace, there is simply less time to
devote to non-work activities, however important or meritorious they
may be. Television, which drew people off their front stoops and away
from communal entertainment and activities, the exodus from neigh-
borhoods to the suburbs, etc., all have had their impact. As Michael
Waltzer so nicely summarizes it, "four mobilities" characterize modern
life.''' These mobilities—geographic, social, political and marital—pro-
vide an unstable and constantly shifting social foundation that under-
mines communal institutions of every description.°
There are deeper sources of erosion as well. For the foreseeable
future, we can expect a continued decline in mediating groups gener-
ally. This is so for at least two reasons. As a nation, we fast are losing
the habit of participating in organizations that require more than
dropping a check in the mail. Moreover, we increasingly no longer see
the need for or the significance of these mediating bodies. They simply
have lost their meaning for us. We will not make a commitment to
things we do not begin to understand. And increasingly, we do not
begin to understand what churches, Shriner's Clubs, unions, the Lower
West Side Democratic Club or even families have to do with anything.
What we characteristically do and the sorts of things we are open
to understanding, indeed, the very sort of questions that will occur to
us, go hand-in-hand. Our habits and our knowings exist in a mutually
conditioning relationship. As we have become less inclined to partici-
pate in mediating groups, we strongly have tended to think and speak
about association in increasingly restricted ways. These in turn embody
stilted and deeply impoverished notions about human character and
the meaning of our personhood.
Briefly stated, we suffer from an odd sort of blindness: we can only
see individuals. It is as if we claimed to know all about the various sorts
of individual trees, but were completely unaware of the forest whose
interdependent series of ecosystems permit those trees to exist and
flourish. We unthinkingly presume that what Walt Whitman celebrated
as the "single, sole self' constitutes the absolute foundation of social
67
 GALLUP & CASTELLI, supra note 52, at 253 (polls show that 4 in 10 Americans "admit to
frequent or occasional feelings of intense loneliness"),
68 Michael Waltzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 Pol.. THEORY 6, 11-12
(1990).
69 Id.
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reality and that every other institution of civil life is merely a derivative.
We thus assume that families, churches, unions and the like constitute
no more than an aggregation of individual, monadic selves. We thereby
implicitly adopt a sort of mechanical reductionism. We regard a ma-
chine as the sum of its parts, but overlook the fact that human com-
munity is far more. Humans are conditioned beings by virtue of the
fact that we live and act only in communities. These communities give
us our orientation and identity. They tell us what we are as humans,
and what the purpose and significance of our lives is. Although we
often pretend otherwise, we do not know ourselves—or nearly any-
thing else—immediately. Instead, what we come to know we learn only
through the mediation of the communities and associations that ground
us as people. Consequently, communities have a normative function,
and well-functioning communities represent an irreducible human
good. In this perspective, communities and associations exist only for
the individual. Yet, the social good is prior to—stands at a higher level
than—the individual good, because without it, the good for discrete
individual persons could not exist. In short, perspective requires bin-
ocular vision.
As moderns, we are much more likely to be adherents of what
Charles Taylor describes as the "clean slate" theory of life. For us, the
past is never prologue, and association is primarily a function of indi-
vidual consent. We assume that we can make and remake ourselves at
will, regardless of the social setting or how we have constituted our-
selves through our previous judgments and acts. With atomism ascen-
dant, the link between act and consequence becomes increasingly
opaque. We typically presume that individuals are sovereign beings
invested with rights that exist independently and regardless of any
societal arrangements. The notion of sovereignty suggests that people
are self-enlightening, self-perfecting and morally complete beings who
can recognize truth—if any is to be found—without the help or me-
diation of others.
This perspective teaches us that we are selves apart from and prior
to any relation with others. Consequently, human association of any
description tends to be understood as artificial and instrumental alli-
ances that are formed for the limited purpose of satisfying the self-di-
rected wants of their otherwise unrelated members. These desires
commonly are reduced to two categories: the desire for companion-
ship (to enable self-fulfillment and self-expression) and the desire for
economic or political power.
Since all forms of association with others are understood as being
motivated essentially by some sort of self-seeking, our generalized dis-
trust of groups is hardly surprising. The very way we speak about
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association instills an understandable ambivalence. The growing em-
phasis in our public discourse on absolute personal autonomy and the
unrestricted freedom of individual choice exacerbates this ambiva-
lence. This language suggests that subjective standards provide the
only legitimate grounds for judging the content of our actions. Conse-
quently, this language implies that individuals properly are unencum-
bered by any obligations unless they choose to accept them. This
approach kills off the ideas of civic duty, public responsibilities and
political life altogether. Moreover, since everything is defined through
its relation to the self, this framework suggests that meaningful asso-
ciation with others requires similarity in experience, taste, behavior or
physical appearance. In short, it implies that association represents an
inward turning that rests on identity: 7° the self and the group simply
mirror and affirm one another. This understanding of association
represents a peculiar variant of individualism, one which, to adapt a
characterization made by Wilson Carey McWilliams, is "so sensitive that
it cannot tolerate rule by others." 7' At its limits, it implies that any sort
of community among persons of different ages, sexes, races or religions
is not possible.
These notions profitably can be compared with the sort of ideas
reflected in the writings of Edmund Burke. As he describes it, society
and the "little platoons" or intermediate associations in which society
exists, constitute
a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a part-
nership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of
such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations,
it becomes a partnership not only between those who are
living, but between those who are living, those who are dead,
and those who are to be born."
In short, much of our ambivalence toward associations stems from
the slim resources we typically have for understanding and describing
their functions and potential. These limitations have helped both to
undermine the sorts of habits that support self-rule and to denude us
of the institutions that nurture the full development of human person-
ality. The mutually conditioning relationship between weakening hab-
"On this point, see WILSON CAREY MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN AMERICA 40
(1973) (discussing identity in customary society and the erotic notion of the self that grounds
the notion of the gemeinschafi).
71 See id
72 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 110 (Thomas Mahoney ed.,
Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill 1955) (1790).
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its of association and narrowing ideas about human character combine
to produce a cycle of decline that affects every aspect of civil life and
threatens the existence of polity generally. Before turning to sources
that may give us some aid in breaking this cycle, it is appropriate to
discuss how unions can act as and support the existence of other
seedbeds of civic virtues.
III. UNIONS AS SEEDBEDS OF THE CIVIC VIRTUES
A word about the meaning of the term "civic virtues" seems in
order before describing how unions and the institution of collective
bargaining can act to promote them. Briefly stated, a virtue is a habit.
It constitutes a consistent way of deliberating, choosing and acting that
is productive of an authentically flourishing human life. Thus, the
essence of virtue is that it represents an operative habit. Acquiring the
virtues results in a consistent disposition to perform well, particularly
in one's relations with others. (Hence, our word ethics derives from
the Greek word for habit-ethos).
Its emphasis on operation and activity raises a point central to the
virtues. This is the recognition that the most authentically and spe-
cifically human of activities typically involve actions in which the good
intended inheres in the activity. In other words, the activity represents
an irreducible good, an end in itself. Consequently, the whole point is
to become engaged in the activity. In the classical viewpoint, for exam-
ple, politics represents the fullest and most complete form of such an
activity: participation in political activity actuates and enhances the
sorts of intellectual and moral habits that citizens must acquire and
continually practice if the common good is to be promoted, and
authentic self-rule to be achieved." The good imminent in such activi-
ties, however, is not strictly confined to those directly involved in their
practice. Rather, the existence of that good through its practice acts to
set the concrete conditions for its ongoing recurrence. Briefly stated,
politics represents a common effort to answer the question of how we
are to live together. To the extent that it is so, a good community in
its very performance devises institutional orders that recognize that the
human good is at once both individual and social. Consequently, every
virtue is in a sense a "civic" virtue. Their practice sets the conditions
for the willing cooperation that sustains and promotes civic life, while
73 0n this sort of activity (or praxis) see RICHARD I3ERNSTEIN, PRAXIS AND ACTION: CONTEM-
PORARY PHILOSOPHIES OF HUMAN ACTIVITY (1971); Matthew Lamb, Praxis, MTH!: NEW DICTION-
ARY OF THEOLOGY 784-87 (Joseph A. Komonchak et al. eds., 1987).
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their lack leads to distrust, withdrawal and eventual social breakdown. 74
Unions and the practice of collective bargaining can serve as institu-
tions that link authentic self-rule with the good of order necessary to
sustain it. To understand how this is so, it is necessary to understand
something about collective bargaining.
There is a tendency to regard bargaining as an institution nar-
rowly concerned with wage rates and benefits. While these matters are
an important aspect of collective bargaining, they hardly constitute its
essence. Collective bargaining can be best and most thoroughly under-
stood as a private law-making system. According to the United States
Supreme Court, the collective bargaining agreement is more than a
contract; it is a generalized code that represents "an effort to erect a
system of industrial self-government" through which the entire employ-
ment relationship can be "governed by an agreed-upon rule of law." 7'
The promulgation and administration of this law is the responsi-
bility of the affected parties alone. Consequently, collective bargaining
agreements typically erect a private adjudication system—the griev-
ance-arbitration process—that the union and employer jointly admin-
ister. These systems normally have jurisdiction over nearly every type
of dispute that might arise concerning the employment relationship.
The presence of an arbitration system generally precludes courts or
other arms of the state from resolving matters that come within the
parties' dispute adjustment scheme. Briefly put, collective bargaining
requires the parties to work out and maintain the order of their
relationship themselves.
Whether and how people participate in decisions about the crite-
ria for promotions, job training, health benefits, the discipline of a
fellow employee or the best way to handle a novel or difficult employ-
ment-relations question may seem trivial. But, it is a tremendous error
to regard such matters as unworthy of serious attention. Individuals
and societies alike become and remain self-governing only by repeat-
edly and regularly engaging in acts of self-government. It is the habit
that sustains the condition. Consequently, a democracy encounters its
greatest danger of becoming perverted when its people no longer have
direct responsibility for making the day-to-day decisions about the
order of their lives. This point represents an important aspect of the
significance of collective bargaining as a social institution. For it is
through their involvement in the collective bargaining process that
average citizens can take part in deciding the law that most directly
74 On these points, see BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 48 (Toronto: Univ.
of Toronto Press, 1992).
75 United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 580 (1960).
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determines the details of their daily lives. Thus, unions and the practice
of bargaining can serve as "schools for democracy" where the habits
of self-governance and direct responsibility are instilled.
At its best, collective bargaining is a conversational activity. This
fact constitutes its fullest significance and most characterizes its poten-
tial contributions. If they are to succeed, the actions a union under-
takes must reflect the consensus of its members. Similarly, a collective
bargaining agreement represents the achievement of a consensus be-
tween employer and employed about the order of their relationship.
Consensus exists as the product of a discussion about what ought to
be valued and why. This sort of discussion, in turn, is the most distinc-
tively human of activities.
People are by nature social beings. This is borne out by the fact
that most of our operating takes the form of cooperating with others, 76
Our innate sociality, however, is not unqualified. We are also intelligent
beings. As such, we demand reasons for what we do. We will not
undertake any activity or agree to any scheme until we have at least
implicitly decided that it is in some way reasonable. Hence, whether
and the degree to which we will subordinate ourselves and our per-
sonal desires to the rules of any sort of social order depends upon our
judgment that the order makes sense. Machiavelli notwithstanding,
force and fraud are never enough to sustain authentic authority.
Our capacity for speech grounds the specifically human charac-
teristics of our natural sociality. As Aristotle observes in the Politics,
unlike other animals whose utterances are limited to expressing pain
and pleasure, the human voice manifests an apprehension of the
desirable and the harmful, the just and the wrongful." Human com-
munity constitutes itself by and exists through a consensus over these
issues. However obscurely, people appeal to notions about fairness and
desirability whenever they attempt to achieve agreement by explaining
and justifying to one another their conclusions and proposals. Since
speech is the vehicle by which we reveal and test our understandings
and judgments, speech is a normative activity, a good in itself. Our
involvement in what the ancients referred to as the civilis conversatio
literally actuates our capacity for self-rule. This fact enables Aristotle
to observe that "in the case of human beings, what seems to count as
living together is this sharing of conversation and thought, not sharing
the same pasture, as in the case of grazing animals." 78
76 See Lonergan, supra note 74, at 27-55.
77 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 1.
78 ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1170b-10-15 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Pub. Co.
1985)
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Community and the willing cooperation it engenders represents
a commonality of understandings, judgments and sentiments. Losing
touch with one another puts that commonality in jeopardy, and ulti-
mately calls the legitimacy of authority into question. By sustaining the
relationship among people, webs of conversation maintain and revivify
the commonality and consensus that cooperation requires.
Conversations do not occur in a vacuum. Given the current situ-
ation, the workplace is a natural place for the "civil conversation" to
occur, and the conditions of the employment relationship constitute a
crucial topic for discussion. As Emile Durkheim so presciently under-
stood, in contemporary society the workplace has become a (and for
many perhaps the) primary source of common life for most adults.
Work creates a moral environment, and its influence extends to nearly
every sphere of one's life. Likewise, work is the chief (and again for
many, the only) place outside the family where people directly are
involved in a common undertaking.
These points not only call attention to the relationship between
the day-to-day routines of the workplace and the civic virtues, but also
highlight a key feature of unions and collective bargaining. Unions are
autonomous bodies. They stand independently of the state and the
organizations that employ their members. They come into being as a
result of employee self-organization, and their health and continuing
existence depends upon the ability of the members to maintain soli-
darity. Winner-take-all attitudes don't produce enduring relationships
or democracies. Unions can provide a forum where people can learn
to prevail on a point without triumphalism, to lose an argument with-
out resentment, and most importantly of all, to practice the art of
reasonable and responsible compromise. In short, unions and the
institution of collective bargaining can act to reduce the sort of un-
reflective and ultimately enervating dependence on the state and the
other large institutions of contemporary life that Tocqueville warned
would erode the habits a democracy requires. By providing a forum
for serious deliberation and self-directed action, collective bargaining
can also reduce the fragmentation and isolation that dissolves commu-
nity and undermines the possibility of authentic self-rule.
The potential impact of collective bargaining on personal habits
reveals itself in the workplace. For example, recent studies show that
unionized workplaces are more productive than others. Recent re-
search also suggests that employee involvement programs and other
workplace innovations perform best, and have the best chance for
survival, where they are jointly administered with a union. Labor turn-
over is also lower among unionized workforces. But the potential
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effects of bargaining on personal habits radiates well-beyond the office,
shopfloor, or the laboratory.
No single mediating body in society, whether in the form of fami-
lies, religious congregations, political, civic or service organizations, or
unions, is likely to survive in the absence of the others. All of these
"seedbeds" require and can instill the same sorts of habits: decision,
commitment, tolerance, mutual respect and direct responsibility. No
single institution alone can inculcate these habits. Consequently, the
existence and decline of all of these bodies is mutually conditioning.
The collapse or deformation of any of them threatens the rest. Because
of the close to universal participation in the workforce, however, unions
have a crucial role to play in supporting and sustaining the health of
these other seedbeds. Habits left untended and unpracticed in one of
life's central arenas will not magically re-appear outside of it.
Collective bargaining provides the only alternative to the pervasive
state regulation of one of life's primary relationships—employment.
Indeed, it is no coincidence that piecemeal regulation of employment
through legislatures and common-law courts markedly has increased
as the practice of collective bargaining has declined. In a society domi-
nated by large organizations, unions can also make an important
contribution to the democratic process by giving an ordered and co-
herent voice to those who would otherwise be without it. The impor-
tance of such regularized and responsive channels of communication
cannot be overlooked. Their absence not only leads to fragmentation
and withdrawal, but also leaves employers and society alike vulnerable
to spontaneous outbursts of discontent delivered through improvised
bodies whose representative status is but self-proclaimed.
Unions can make other contributions to social and political sta-
bility as well. Democratic regimes, as Aristotle, Montesquieu and Toc-
queville all point out, require some rough sort of material and economic
equality among their citizens if they are to survive as democracies. By
moderating the dispersion of earnings and affecting the distribution
of incomes, unions can assist in maintaining the sorts of material
conditions necessary to democratic regimes. In periods of rapid tech-
nological change and structural shifts in the economic order, unions
can also moderate the sorts of instrumental rationality that ultimately
pits the market against the local and particular institutions that ground
a democratic regime.
Reviving and reimagining the practice of collective bargaining
presents no easy task. It requires rethinking what unions are and have
the potential to be. It also compels a thoroughgoing reassessment of
the patterns by which we presently constitute our institutional orders.
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Fortunately, we are not without sources for guiding our thinking on
these matters, and it is to them that we now turn.
IV. SOURCES OF RESTORATION: THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE AND
THE GOOD OF ORDER
The trouble with discussing any of the particular seedbeds is that
at some point one has to consider them all. Each has a special set of
functions to perform. Yet, those discrete sets of institutional operations
are interrelated and ultimately only become intelligible in light of the
whole. The real worth of unions, for example, lies in the contributions
they can make in assisting the full development of human personality,
the proper unfolding of which can only be determined through a set
of values that are truly intelligible. To consider how we are to live
together forces us to ask what it means to be a person.
Consequently, any attempt to rethink, reorient and revivify the
various seedbeds must proceed along a broad front. And, if we are to
get beyond the iron cage that results from seeing the market or the
state as the sole available choices, our efforts and the thought that
guides them must be comprehensive. Because the human good is both
individual and social, we need a standard for organizing our institu-
tions that can take advantage of our natural sociality in a way that is
consistent with our character as reasonable beings. 79 The subsidiarity
principle supplies such guidance.
Simply stated, subsidiarity is an organizational norm. It teaches
that social institutions of every description should be ordered so that
decisionmaking and the responsibility for acting remain at the lowest
capable level. The principle insists that the state and all other forms
of society exist exclusively for the individual. Consequently, social bod-
ies should not assume what individuals can do, nor should larger
groups take-up what smaller associations can accomplish. Conversely,
the state and other large institutions have the duty to undertake those
functions that neither individuals nor smaller associations can per-
form. From this perspective, communities and social institutions exist
to supply help (subsidium) to individuals in assuming self-responsibility.
The subsidiary function of community thus rests not in displacing but
in establishing the conditions for authentic self-determination.
The insights embodied in the susidiarity principle stem from its
practical yet nuanced understanding of human character. The princi-
ple emphasizes the primacy of humans as intelligent, reasonable and
75 On these points, see Kohler, supra note 27, and sources cited therein.
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responsible beings. It thus reflects the realization that deliberating,
judging and choosing are the most characteristically human activities,
and that the desire to live reasonably is basic to humans.
The second aspect of the anthropology that informs the susidiarity
principle consists in its understanding of humans as situated beings.
Subsidiarity recognizes that individuals, social institutions of every sort
and culture stand in a normative and mutually conditioning relation-
ship. Consequently, over time, all rise and decline in concert, each
influencing the other. Subsidiarity seeks to promote the full unfolding
of human personality by giving individuals the fullest possible oppor-
tunity to reflect, choose and act for themselves, and to take responsi-
bility for the outcomes. The principle is in the best sense democratic.
It opens the choices and rationale of institutions and individuals alike
to the broadest possible examination and discussion. In so doing, the
principle relies upon the normativity of speech as it engages people in
a concrete exchange about what ought to be done here and now. This
understanding of humans as conversational beings is the third element
of the anthropology of the subsidiarity principle. Through its insis-
tence on vesting authority at the lowest capable level and its emphasis
on mediating bodies, subsidiarity seeks to engage both our natural
sociality as well as our desire to live reasonably. Subsidiarity supplies
guidance for devising well-constituted institutional orders of every type.
The principle, however, is formal rather than substantive. Consistent
with the view of the person that grounds it, subsidiarity depends on
common sense and dialogue for its application. It is an heuristic device
that guides deliberation, but does not attempt to dictate the content
of the outcomes. The principle is flexible, not dogmatic, and stresses
practical insight over structural certainty and uniformity.
One journalist recently described subsidiarity as "an arcane theo-
logical principle." In reality, it is neither, although the principle does
find its roots in Catholic social thought. Social Catholicism arose in
Germany in the mid-nineteenth century as a response to two develop-
ments: the severe social dislocations and urban poverty that accompa-
nied the rise of industrialism, and the challenges posed by critical
social philosophy, particularly that of Marx. Catholic social thought
might be described as meliorist in that it early on accepted markets
and institutions like private property as being indispensable to an
industrialized society. The teachings, however, go on to qualify modern
liberal theory by characterizing the sorts of responsibilities that attach
to the ownership of property and capital. From the first, the social
teachings have been concerned with establishing the conditions requi-
site to authentic self-rule. As a result, the teachings consistently have
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called for self-help through labor unions, producer's cooperatives and
other self-organized associations, supported by a limited program of
social legislation. Subsidiarity was integral to the first papal social
encyclical, .serum Novarum, which was issued in 1891. It was not until
the 1931 encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, that the principle received
either its name or a comprehensive formulation. The principle since
has been invoked in the social encyclicals of every pope.
Despite its provenance, however, subsidiarity properly has been
characterized as "neither a theological nor even really a philosophical
principle, but a piece of congealed historical wisdom." 8° Even the man
who coined the term, Oswald von Nell-Breuning, called it an "ancient"
principle. Its themes are consistent with the insights of Tocqueville and
John Dewey, among others, concerning the types of social arrange-
ments that enhance responsible self-rule and ongoing cooperation.
The subsidiarity principle lies at the core of the European Com-
munity's Social Charter, some of whose provisions were mentioned
earlier. Indeed, the principle illuminates much of the Charter's mean-
ing, and it stands as a maxim for arranging the order of all types of
social institutions within the Community. The principle has much to
tell us as well. Sustaining the conditions for authentic self-rule is an
ongoing project that requires comprehensive ways of acting and think-
ing. Subsidiarity supplies us with a method for proceeding in this
work—one that is consistent with what we as humans are and have the
potential to become.
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McCormick, S.J., eds., 1986).
